Two-thousand Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) troops, most of them from Saudi Arabia, entered Bahrain on Monday -- ostensibly to
provide security to government installations "threatened" by protestors. In
fact, such a show of force, with more troops on the way, is an attempt
by the Saudi-led GCC to stiffen the resolve of the ruling house in Bahrain to
put down the democracy protests if need be with force. The violence unleashed
by the Bahraini army and police against peaceful protestors on Tuesday was the
direct outcome of the Saudi/GCC military intervention.
Various
interpretations have been put forward as to the reasons behind the Saudi-led
military intervention. These include pre-empting the emergence of a pro-Iranian,
Shia-dominated government in Bahrain and tilting the balance in favor of the
hard-line faction among the al-Khalifa and against the more moderate faction
allegedly led by the crown prince.
What is missing
from these explanations is a discussion of the essential nature of the GCC that
has propelled it to intervene in the internal affairs of a member country. The
Gulf Cooperation Council was established in 1981 in the wake of the Iranian
revolution, ostensibly to promote economic cooperation and defend its members
against external threats. However, it quickly became clear that given the
similar nature of oil producing rentier economies in the Gulf, talk about
increasing economic exchange was merely a façade. So was the argument that the
Gulf monarchies needed an organization to coordinate their external security
policies. The only act of major security cooperation they engaged in was to
supply billions of dollars to the Saddam regime in Iraq, first to help it
invade Iran in 1980 and then to stave off an Iranian victory that seemed
imminent between 1982 and 1984.
Their lack of
capacity to protect themselves against external threats was clearly
demonstrated in 1990 when Iraq occupied Kuwait. Despite the billions spent by
Saudi Arabia in particular to acquire state of the art weaponry from the United
States, the kingdom had to invite in a half million American troops to defend
itself and eventually force Iraq out of Kuwait. It was clear that the Gulf monarchies,
above all Saudi Arabia, the largest and most powerful among them, were
incapable of defending themselves against external threats, actual or presumed,
without American boots on the ground.
The real reason
for the establishment of the GCC in 1981 was not defense against external
enemies threatening the security of GCC states but cooperation against domestic
challenges to authoritarian regimes. Its main task was and continues to be
coordination of internal security measures, including sharing of intelligence,
aimed at controlling and suppressing the populations of member states in order
to provide security to the autocratic monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The
establishment of the GCC was in large measure a reaction on the part of the
Gulf monarchies to the Iranian revolution of 1979 in which people's power
toppled the strongest autocracy in the neighborhood. The Arab autocracies of
the Gulf did not want to share the Shah's fate.
That ensuring the
security of autocratic regimes was the principal reason for the existence of
GCC has become crystal clear with the military intervention by Saudi-led forces
in Bahrain to put down the democracy movement and prevent the freedom contagion
from spreading to other parts of the Gulf. It is true that the Saudis are
apprehensive of the Shia majority coming to power in Bahrain because of the
impact it could have on its own restive Shia minority in the oil-rich east of
the country. Riyadh is also worried about the impact of a change in regime in
Bahrain on the balance of power between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the region. (One can, however, argue that Saudi military intervention in Bahrain's affairs
will in fact redound to Iran's benefit in the long run by further
de-legitimizing the al-Khalifa rule in Bahrain).
But these are
secondary explanations. The primary concern of the Arab autocracies in the Gulf
is the suppression of democratic movements regardless of the sectarian
character of the populations engaging in democratic struggles. They are worried
that if any of the autocracies fall or even reach a substantial compromise with
democratic movements it will have a domino effect in the entire Gulf region
consigning all of them to the dustbin of history. The GCC was established as an
instrument to protect and prolong autocratic rule on the Arabian littoral of
the Gulf. Its military operation in Bahrain has clearly shown this true colors.
Mohammed Ayoob is university distinguished professor
of international relations at Michigan State University.
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