One year ago this week, a United
States Institute of Peace report
warned that the widening moral, ideological and social gap between regimes and
societies had left Arab regimes vulnerable to "systemic domestic crises and
exogenous economic, political or security shocks." But if the tumultuous
protests in Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria and most recently Egypt are to have any
kind of silver lining, they must be the catalyst for a major reevaluation of
how the U.S. can most effectively promote democratic change in the Arab world.
For starters, this effort should
reexamine the "demand side" approach that has long guided U.S. democracy
assistance programs. This approach assumes that local civil society groups can
acquire the capacity to prod regimes to reform. While important, by themselves
civil society groups can achieve little. On the contrary, substantive political
change will never unfold absent high-level efforts by our national leaders and
diplomats to encourage Arab regimes to supply
substantive constitutional, legal and institutional democratic reforms. U.S.
democracy promoters are well aware of the need for such a supply side strategy.
But many, and particularly those in government, question whether the U.S. has
the diplomatic leverage to press Arab rulers to move beyond the boundaries of
state-managed political participation.
The answer to that very valid
point is now before us. By calling for the very downfall of discredited rulers,
Arab protestors have provided the U.S. the leverage our policy makers say is
missing. There has never been a better moment to make clear to the region's
ruling elites that standing between them and the marchers is a workable
alternative, one that is far better than the abyss of a violent clamp down: to
begin a genuine (as opposed to cosmetic) dialogue within the pinnacle of the
state -- and with opposition leaders themselves -- about how to build genuine
and effective democratic governance.
Such a dialogue does not
presuppose -- and is unlikely to produce -- regime downfalls. In contrast to
Tunisia's full-blown autocracy, the leaders of Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and
Kuwait have permitted a measure of state-controlled competition and pluralism.
The institutional apparatus associated with these experiments in "liberalized
autocracy" may be frayed and discredited in the eyes of many Arabs. But they
are likely to survive, thus creating the complicated but unavoidable political
landscape upon which any effort to move beyond destabilizing bouts of
state-managed political liberalization and de-liberalization must unfold.
And so the question facing
governments and oppositions, as well as Western democracy assistance
organizations, is this: how can a
serious dialogue begin in a context of growing polarization between regimes and
oppositions, and within oppositions themselves? From Rabat to Amman,
autocracies have skirted genuine democratization by fostering and magnifying
conflict between Islamists and secularists. By giving just enough space to both
groups, while also denying them any real power, regimes have encouraged
secularists to look to autocracies for their ultimate protection.
To undermine this cynical
protection racket, Islamist and secularist opposition activists must hammer out
a common vision of reform. The U.S. and other Western states, acting through
both international and local NGOs, should avidly encourage this kind of peace
making and dialogue within Arab oppositions.
If and when these dialogues
produce serious proposals, they must then be directed to those regime actors
who evince some interest in genuine political change. Many of these actors,
including President Hosni Mubarak's son (and possible heir) Gamal, will surely
view these dialogues as little more than an opportunity to reimpose the old
rules of the game. But it is also possible that today's cynics can be prodded
to see in a moment of profound crisis a chance to transform the façade of
state-managed participation into a structure of genuine democratic
participation.
For this to happen we need a strategy
geared to the particular challenges of state-managed liberalized autocracy. President
Obama's remarks about Tunisia's democratic opposition during his State of the
Union speech offer an inspiring start. Equally important are those sections of
the Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) dedicated to democracy and
human rights. But while the QDDR calls for partnering with "those governments
and local organizations...that show strong commitment to development and
democracy," it has little to say about how to get regimes to be part of the
solution rather than the problem. If we want to achieve something more than
inadvertently sustaining the Potemkin reform strategies of the Arab world's
wily autocrats, that particular conversation must begin now, if not yesterday.
Daniel Brumberg is a Senior Advisor to the Center for Conflict Analysis
at the United States Institute of Peace and Co-Director of Democracy and
Governance Studies at Georgetown University.
Read More
(1)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE