As Egypt nears its upcoming presidential elections, the country remains mired in continued political instability and the fog of events that has characterized the country's opaque transition. As a result, crises remain unexplained and inscrutable, further complicating the ability to gauge voter sentiment with any degree of confidence. Coupled with the rudimentary history of public polling and their utter unreliability in the Egyptian context, predictions about electoral outcomes should be approached with the utmost degree of caution. While signs point to a fragmented voter distribution in the first round of voting, there is much we still do not know about the Egyptian electorate and voter behavior. However, based on recent interviews and meetings with Egyptian political leaders and commentators, it is clear that a backlash has developed against the Islamist-led parliament. The scope and breadth of that backlash will now determine whether the compromised former foreign minister of Egypt, Amr Moussa, becomes the country's next president.  

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For most people in the world, retirement is a time of idleness and careful penny-pinching of pensions or savings. Senior Egyptian military officers, however, are not most people in the world. Upon retiring from his post, a senior officer in Egypt's military becomes a governor of a province, a manager of a town, or a head of a city neighborhood. Or he might run a factory or a company owned by the state or the military. He might even manage a seaport or a large oil company. Luckily for him, he also retains his Armed Forces pension, on top of the high salary for his new civilian job. This privileged group holds almost every high position in the state. Egypt is par excellence a republic of retired generals.

Egypt's first post-Mubarak presidential election is rapidly approaching, scheduled to begin at the end of May. Candidates of varied political stances are enthusiastically campaigning in media and touring the length of the country offering promises on everything from security to education to foreign policy. But amid this busy atmosphere, there is silence on the most sensitive and crucial question: Will any civilian winner be able to demilitarize the Egyptian state? 

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"Who needs to watch sitcoms on TV anymore? We watch Egyptian news instead for entertainment."

That's the view of many Egyptians over the entries into and disqualifications from the presidential race. Now that the dust has cleared, and leading candidates Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail, Omar Suleiman and Khairat el-Shater gone, the race has lost some of its drama, but still remains fascinating. In the last 24 hours, yet another candidate might be a thing of the past -- and there is still a month left to go.

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The phrase "Egyptian transition process" has become tragicomically oxymoronic in light of the dizzying series of developments over the past month. More metaphorically, events have driven entire herds of elephants stampeding through every legal and constitutional loophole in Egypt's makeshift interim political system.

There are, to be sure, some rules. In the seven weeks following former President Hosni Mubarak's forced departure last year, a series of policy statements by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), a set of constitutional amendments developed by an ad hoc committee appointed by the SCAF and approved in a referendum, and a "constitutional declaration" drafted secretly and proclaimed by the SCAF collectively laid out a set of procedures for rebuilding the Egyptian political order. Those procedures have largely been followed. But they have led Egypt into a state of complete confusion.

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Less than six months after the country's first democratic elections and only four months into the government's mandate, Tunisia's ruling party, Ennahda, has announced its intentions to hold the country's next elections one year from now. The announcement came as a surprise as some thought the government was set on taking its time, while others questioned how a government that has only just begun writing a constitution could plan for elections. Although some parties in the constituent assembly have dissented from the announcement, with Ennahda's backing, it will likely proceed as announced.

While outside the country Tunisia's successful elections and relatively peaceful transition have been praised, Tunisians have been more skeptical. Many have criticized the government's slow pace and opposition parties have capitalized on the perceived inaction by the government on the economy and security situation. The electoral timetable, along with the government's recently released budget, are both tactical and strategic. The timetable will ward off criticism of its intentions to hold power indefinitely and the deadline will set the pace for constitution writing in the coming year. The budget-busting spending will aim to curry favor among voters, who are eager to see tangible material benefits from their historic uprising. Together, one begins to see the foundations for Ennahda's electoral strategy.

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The escalating bloodshed in Syria has rapidly become the center of regional and international attention. While the United States and its allies struggle to find ways to effectively help the Syrian people, the body count mounts and the prospects of a negotiated transition grow dim. Meanwhile, a growing chorus calls for a military intervention to protect Syrian civilians or to accelerate the fall of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The response to the Syrian crisis is shaped by its unique combination of humanitarian crisis and strategic significance. The horrifying death toll and the political failures of the Syrian regime are real, urgent, and undeniable. So are the strategic stakes of a potential regime change in a long-time adversary of the United States and its allies, and the key Arab ally of Iran. The Syrian crisis has revealed and exacerbated the profound tension between the narrative of "Resistance" which has long shaped regional discourse and the narrative of the Arab uprisings.

Our new POMEPS briefing, "The Syria Crisis" -- to which this post is the introduction -- surveys the issues posed by the ongoing struggle in Syria. The the ninth in our Arab Uprising Briefing series, "The Syrian Crisis" collects recent analysis and commentary from the Middle East Channel on these urgent questions.

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"Where do I stamp?" said the old man, flashing a wry smile as he dipped his thumb into a pot of ink and peered down at the piece of paper in front of him. With a picture of Yemen's balding vice president, Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, next to a map of Yemen in the colors of the rainbow, the card looked more like a ticket for a Ferris wheel ride than a ballot paper. Pausing for a second, the man pressed his thumb into the circle next to the face of the vice president -- the only candidate on the ballot paper. "I'm voting to save Yemen," he told me, before folding the ballot in half and stuffing it into the voting box.

It was a year ago this month that young men and women, spurred on by the dramatic downfall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, first flooded the streets of Sanaa with noisy demonstrations against the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. On Tuesday, Feb. 21, the wily, 65-year-old leader was pushed out of his 33-year presidency through the ballot box. Millions of Yemenis turned out to vote in a one-candidate election, ushering in Yemen's vice president as leader and making Saleh -- who is in New York undergoing treatment for burns suffered in a bomb attack against him in June -- the fourth Arab leader to be ousted by the mass uprisings of last year.

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On February 20, 2011, Moroccan youth activists, inspired by protesters in Tunisia and Egypt, staged major demonstrations for democratic reform and "freedom and dignity for all Moroccans." Avoiding the indecision and dramatic scenes of repression seen in other Arab capitals, Morocco's King Mohammed VI responded rapidly with a televised address that acknowledged the protesters' grievances and promised major constitutional reforms, including a stronger parliament, free and fair elections, and the protection of human rights. Following a national referendum on the king's constitutional amendments and watershed elections that brought new leadership to power, what has the February 20th movement accomplished? Who has benefited from the protest movement? One year on, who are the winners and losers?

For the past six months, I have conducted interviews with the activists, supporters, and opponents of Rabat's February 20th movement, who have continued to stage peaceful marches, but not with the same numbers they had in the first half of 2011. Movement activists state frankly that they are not currently winning the political battle. They note that the new constitution, passed by referendum on July 1, 2011, did little to curtail the king's powers or enshrine a genuine parliamentary monarchy. "We have not achieved any of our objectives," said one young woman. "In fact, things have gotten worse, not better." Although several thousand took to the streets across Morocco this past weekend to commemorate the movement's anniversary, the movement appears to be foundering.

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Islamist movements did not start Yemen's revolution, but they have loomed large over its fate. Tawakkol Karman, an ex-member of Islah, a coalition party that includes Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 for her tireless political campaigning. Backers of outgoing President Ali Abdullah Saleh warned of the inexorable rise of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), even after the killing of ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki by a U.S. drone.

But as in much of the Arab world, the Yemeni revolution has presented both opportunities and challenges to its Islamists. At least five different Islamist trends have played important roles in the unfolding events -- and some have fared better than others. Those struggling to help Yemen's political transition must recognize the diversity and internal struggles among these Islamist trends, and be prepared to engage with them as part of the country's political landscape.

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Welcome back to Episode 3 of Abu Aardvark's MEC Video Blog! In this week's installment, I discuss the potential for a U.N. Security Council resolution on Syria. I was at the United Nations for Tuesday's debate, and had the chance to talk to a number of key players. On Wednesday I posted my thoughts about what such a resolution might accomplish, and on the video blog I answer a number of questions that have been posed about those efforts. I also talk about Kuwait's Parliamentary election, with a special appearance by former U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait Edward "Skip" Gnehm, and about what the horrible violence at a football game in Port Said might mean for Egypt's political transition. 

Enjoy, and as always we welcome your feedback on our ongoing video blog experiment!

General Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, head of Egypt's ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, announced the lifting of the much-criticized State of Emergency today on the eve of the anniversary of the revolution. Ending the state of emergency has been one of the primary demands of Egyptian activists and civil society, as well as the international community, for many years. What does it mean? The Middle East Channel asked Nathan Brown, a leading expert on the Egyptian constitution, for his thoughts: 

General Tantawi appears to have given the Egyptian Revolution a tremendous birthday gift -- he has ended a state of emergency that has lasted (with only brief interruptions) since the 76-year-old general was four. Except, of course, for the baltagiyya, hooligans or thugs who roam Egyptian streets attacking peaceful citizens and virtuous revolutionaries. 

Ending the state of emergency was one of the most important demands of the revolutionary coalition that ousted President Hosni Mubarak last year. I have read only news accounts of his action, but those make it clear that the fine print makes this a bit less of a gift than it initially appears. As far as I can make out:

• Tantawi did not repeal the emergency law -- that law remains on the books. It would probably be up to the parliament to amend it.
• What Tantawi did instead was end the state of emergency for most areas. Here is the distinction: the emergency law gets activated upon the declaration of a state of emergency; such a declaration requires parliamentary approval to continue.
• The state of emergency was approved 2.5 years ago by Mubarak's rubber-stamp parliament; it was approved at that point for three years. Thus, according to the SCAF, it remains in effect until June 2012. Any extension after June 2012 would require parliamentary approval. It will be the president whose election is promised in June who will have to deal with the full end of the state of emergency.
• The state of emergency still applies for thuggery. That means, in essence, that the SCAF can transfer thugs to military courts for trial. And that is one of the major complaints of the revolutionary groups, who point out that they have been victims of (rather than protected by) the SCAF's purported moves against thuggery.
• Any extension after June 2012 by the newly-elected parliament is politically out of the question unless there is a major change in Egypt's security situation. Even then it would be politically very difficult to extend the state of emergency. I did ask Freedom and Justice Party deputies about this last week on a brief visit to Cairo; they chuckled at the idea of a renewal. So the revolutionaries may eventually get their gift, but just not on the revolution's birthday.
• An argument can be made that the state of emergency has already ended (Tariq al-Bishri holds such a view) but I think that argument has gotten nowhere politically.

Women are at a crossroads in the Middle East and North Africa. This is widely reflected in the current battles over the adoption of quotas aimed at improving women's chances of being elected into parliaments. Although women's quotas were introduced as early as 1979 in Egypt, there are new efforts underway in the Middle East to implement them. Last year, Tunisia adopted a law requiring that party lists alternate between men and women. In a more restrained manner, Libya recently drafted an election law that gives women only 10 percent of the seats. However, the struggle for quotas has also met with resistance as in Egypt, which abandoned a 2010 quota law altogether that would have ensured the presence of 64 women in the parliament.  

Quotas are not only being adopted in the legislative arena in the Middle East, they are being entertained in government as well. Recently, the Iraqi cabinet approved a quota system that requires women to make up half of all hires in the ministries of health and education and to account for 30 percent of hires at all other ministries.

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It's time for the official, Aardvark-certified list of the Best Books on the Middle East for 2011! (See last year's winners here.) Next year's list will undoubtedly be dominated by books addressing this year's uprisings which have transformed the Arab world, but not many significant books on the topic were published in 2011.  That'll hopefully change on March 27, when my own book The Arab Uprising comes out -- don't worry, it won't be eligible for the 2012 awards of course! -- and, all joking aside, when a number of great journalists and scholars weigh in with books in the pipeline.  In the meantime, you can always go back to Revolution in the Arab World, the eBook based on Foreign Policy articles, which I think remains an outstanding guide to the first few months.

First, the ground rules. The awards are limited to English-language books that were published in calendar year 2011 and which dealt primarily with the contemporary broader Middle East. I read more than 65 books published this year which fit that description, from academic and trade presses alike. The award is entirely subjective, based on what I found impressive or interesting. There's no committee, no publishers sent me free copies or offered up lucrative swag, and I couldn't read everything -- especially if books were published too late in the year or if publishers insisted on releasing them only as $90 hardcovers. If your book didn't make the list, however, then you know what do do (hint: you really can't go wrong by blaming Blake Hounshell).

And with that...the 2011 Aardvark Awards for the Best Books on the Middle East:

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Millions of women were among the 52 percent of eligible voters who cast ballots in Egypt's parliamentary elections this week, but preliminary results suggest that Egypt's first popularly elected legislature since the revolution might not include a single female face. Despite anecdotal reports of massive female turnout in Cairo and the other eight governorates that cast ballots in this first of three rounds of voting, women may very well be the biggest losers of an election that has been hailed as the freest and fairest in Egypt's recent history. Although 376 female candidates are running for parliament, not a single woman has won a seat so far in the 508-seat People's Assembly after the first two days of voting on November 28 and 29 and this week's runoff races. And there is good reason to believe that women will fare just as poorly in subsequent rounds of voting.The second and third stages of elections, slated for December and January, will include Egypt's most rural and conservative districts where gender biases are more deeply ingrained than the urban centers of Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said that voted this week. Faced with the possibility of an entirely male parliament, many Egyptians are wondering: Were women left behind by the Revolution?

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