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BY MICHELE DUNNE | JULY 23, 2010

Egypt these days feels like a restless sea, pulling this way and that, without a clear direction. One can make a reasonable argument that all these shifting currents are really about economic and labor grievances, or human rights abuses, or the youth bulge, or the need for political reform, or presidential succession.  One can argue that Egypt is on the cusp of profound change or that it will get a succession over with in the next year or two and go back to pretty much the status quo ante.

But rather than trying to puzzle out how change might come in Egypt, perhaps it is more useful to describe in broad terms what has already changed. Looking at political life, when I think of the Egypt of ten years ago (let alone 20 or 30), I can hardly believe how different it is today. As recently as 2000, Egyptians got their information primarily from government-controlled media and public discussion of controversial issues was tightly limited. Ask Saad Eddin Ibrahim, who landed in jail that year for making a joke about the possibilitythat Egypt would attempt a hereditary succession along the lines of Syria's.  Now, while journalists and bloggers still face harassment, the train has left the station when it comes to media.  The independent daily al-Masry al-Youm outsells the government papers, satellite talk shows probe into sensitive corners of political and social life, and young journalists and bloggers are as ubiquitous in Cairo as taxicabs.  A few taboos remain, notably any direct criticism of the Egyptian military.

Similarly, ten years ago leaders or employees of non-governmental organizations treating sensitive issues such as human rights or political freedom were treated as enemies of the state, subject to frequent harassment and always in fear of arrest or intimidation.  Parents would be concerned for the future of a son or daughter who went to work for such an NGO.  Now, while NGO leaders are still not beloved by the government, they have the ear of the public.  Their opinions appear prominently in the independent media, but also sometimes on the pages of government organs such as al-Ahram.  Egyptian government officials give them a polite (if irritated) hearing in the U.N. Human Rights Council and are obligated to reply to their recommendations.  And working for a human rights NGO no longer places a young Egyptian on the fringes of society; it has become legitimate in many social quarters.        

This is where I see some of the big changes.  There are spheres of public activity that once were off limits -- free media and civil society advocacy -- that now have become legitimate in the eyes of the government, and even more important, in the eyes of Egyptian citizens. While the regime will still occasionally make an example of a journalist or civil society activist, increasingly Egyptians view this as unacceptable, as injustice rather than as expected punishment for transgressing unwritten rules. Witness the surprisingly vigorous reaction to the beating death of Khaled Said in early June. Egyptian citizens increasingly act as though they believe they have certain rights and should not be subjected to the caprices of the regime.

There is another sphere of public activity that has not yet become legitimate in Egypt, but that might be getting there, and that is political contestation. So far, most Egyptians do not behave as though they have the right to choose their rulers and call them to account through the ballot box. Certainly the regime does not consider politics to be legitimate. But the surprisingly positive reaction of Egyptian citizens to the seven-point initiative of Mohamed ElBaradei --which would make real political contestation legitimate -- suggests that the idea is gaining ground among the public. Whether or not Dr. ElBaradei gets his million signatures (apparently he is about 20 percent along the way after a few months), if citizens on a large scale start acting as though they want and deserve open political contestation, we are looking at big change.  And if that happens, the United States will have some tough choices to make about whether it values more its friendship with the regime or with the people of Egypt.

Michele Dunne is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin.

AFP/Getty Images

 SUBJECTS:
 

DEBANJAN

8:36 AM ET

July 24, 2010

Interesting article

What Egypt needs is to learn from Turkey. Following the line by the Mubarak regime or the dictations from the White house , means the same for the Egyptians i.e. slavery.

Egyptians need to think independently like and decide on the lines like their Muslim brethren in Iran did 31 years ago or their current brethren in Turkey doing now.

 

SCOTTGOOSE

4:13 PM ET

July 25, 2010

DEBANJAN, the diametric opposite is true, however unfortunate

Frankly, it would be a waste of time to bother naming the countless geopolitical reasons why a (unfortunate, but for practical reasons, a reality) borderline monarchy that stands as the mediator for Arab affairs, along side the house of Saud, however secondarily. The unfortunate reality is that a truly democratic Egypt is a dangerous thing, given the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood has firm control of the opposition. However "moderate" the MB may be -- and even, in social and civic respects, beneficial -- in Egypt, there simple cannot democracy allowed in a country where, at minimum, a group commanding the plurality of the opposition and bred Hamas while advocating the rise of an Ummah run by in a global Caliphate. When you get down to brass tacks, it's unfortunately that simple.

Egyptians are allowed to think independently, but they're actions thus far, while lacking (for reasons outlined above) in democratic transparency and freedom, have permitted Egypt to accrue a powerful position in the most dangerous neighborhood on earth. As his son or Intelligence minister, Omar Suleiman, know quite well, Iran has turned itself into even more of a joke and a pariah than it was in 2000.

What worked for Turkey was their economic might and entrepreneurial espirit (16th GDP in the country), not their eastern pivot and decidedly eastern pivot and Islamist-bent.

Bottom line: What worked for Turkey and doesn't work for Iran will certainly not be beneficial for Egypt. Period.

 

HUGH

10:59 AM ET

July 26, 2010

Hmmmm...

I'd agree with Debanjan that this is an interesting article, particularly because it's written by a Carnegie writer, whose usual writers like Marina Ottaway follow the line that there's been no significant reforms in the Arab world. In fact I seem to remember this writer, Michelle Dunne, taking this line with articles saying completely the opposite of this one for FP. There was one in the Washington Post a couple of weeks back stating that Egypt's increasingly brittle and suggested that Obama must push immediately for action because Egypt's heading for a trainwreck. So what's significant about this FP article is less what's said but who's saying it. And raises the question: why the turn around now?

 

JKOLAK

6:19 AM ET

July 27, 2010

Either Or

"the United States will have some tough choices to make about whether it values more its friendship with the regime or with the people of Egypt."

It doesn't have to be either or. We can help both.

 

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